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  • Mark 10:35 am on January 24, 2019 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: class, , , ,   

    Who are the super-rich and what do they want? 

    My notes on Davies, W. (2017). Elites without hierarchies: Intermediaries,‘agency’and the super-rich. In Cities and the super-rich (pp. 19-38). Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

    Who are the super-rich, and what do they want? This is the question which a thought provoking paper by Will Davies begins with and it’s one which has preoccupied me in recent years. Our statistical understand of the super-rich has increased in recent years but this increased knowledge leaves a range of sociological questions which need to be addressed:

    What do they want to do with all that money, other than protect it, grow it and pass it on to their children? Do they want political power, and if so, of what kind and to what end? Or do they employ it culturally, to achieve their own modes of Bourdieusian distinction from the other 99.9%? (pg 2)

    For a Millsian approach to elites, the question is which political, cultural or military  institutions are they gravitating towards in pursuit of power? For the Marxist approach, it’s a question of shared interests, their collective consciousness of them and self-organisation in pursuit of them in relation to other classes, as well as the tools of exploitation leveraged in this process. Davies agrees with Mike Savage that these aren’t necessarily the right questions, summarising his argument that we need to take money seriously as money (rather than assume it is waiting to be converted into power, with the assumption elites are intrinsically political) and must adequately describe capital before we can theorise it (rather than apply pre-existing categories to incomplete or outdated descriptions of our object).

    What is this object? Is it a class? Is it a group? To what extent is it open or closed? To these challenges Davies adds another one: “the need to avoid wholesale methodological individualism, while recognising the deeply personal and individualised nature of the relationships and strategies that appear to structure the lives of the super-rich” (pg 3). Piketty’s contribution is to reorientate analysis way from the labour market and towards the family. But this is difficult because knowledge is partial and the super-rich is secretive. In order to addresses these challenges, Davies suggests we study intermediaries: agents working on behalf of the super-rich who represent their interests. By focusing on agency, in the sense of one party being contracted to represent the interests of another, it is possible to response to Savage’s challenges and move the study of the super rich forward.

    He draws on Simmel’s account of money as a teleological vacuum, a pure means which extends beyond every possible use to which it can be put, connecting this to the ambitions of the super-rich. Piketty’s insight about the increasing importance of unearned wealth in the economy, as well as Dorling’s recognition of the professional classes now being subsumed into the 99%, yield a sense of the super-rich as breaking away. As he puts it on pg 6, “To break free of the bounds of culture, politics or technological limits becomes a teleology in itself, the same anti-teleology that Simmel identified as the metaphysical nature of money”. This is tied to a phenomenology of valuing money as “a state of arbitrariness, where money can be experienced as perfect liquidity, without friction” and “extreme form of negative liberty that lacks all normative restraint and relationship only to the future” (pg 16).

    The problem of agency is key if we wish to avoid taking this analysis too far, with their insulation depending on the capacity of agents to represent the interests of the super-rich to the wider world. He summarises this as a theoretical approach on pg 8:

    In this spirit, I want to propose a theoretical device which may help to shape a sociological approach to the super-rich – principle-agent problems. In particular, I suggest that we can think of the relationship of the super-rich to domains of power, culture and production as a series of principle-agent problems, in which they seek a form of representation which absolves them of the need to become involved in matters of public concern or controversy.

    Principle-agent problems rest on the “paranoid methodological individualism” associated with game theory, with the primary challenge being to ensure the agent does not use their position to pursue their own private interests rather than those of the principle they are representing. Interestingly, this is the rationale for stock options for executives, theoretically encouraging them to act in pursuit of shareholder interest by making them a shareholder. But as Davies notes, the fact executive renumeration has risen more quickly than the stock market suggests it actually makes the agency problem worse.

    This ties to a broader ambiguity about their position, as “symptoms of the deep-lying ambiguity surrounding the corporate form generally, which is neither a piece of private property nor a political association, but flips from one to the other as it suits” (pg 9). Training as professionals has been one solution but managers lack the monopoly over a specific domain of knowledge typical of professionals and their connection to the public interest is tentative and contestable. Techniques such as edit and credit rating were introduced to address this ambiguity but this introduce their own problem of agency, at least if the rating agency is paid by the company it rates.

    This sociological reframing of the principle-agent problem “is a particular way of
    representing the interface of politics and economics” (pg 11). If I understand him correctly, economics is insulated from politics by outsourcing normative evaluation to agents; capital can float free of controversy because the evaluation, justification and debate takes place at a distance through the mediation of ratings agencies, auditors, central bankers and policy makers. It is a form of “moral under-writing – declaring that activities are transparent and trustworthy, sometimes when they are not” (pg 15). The same analysis can be applied to the growth of family offices whose purposes is to “save super-rich families from having to engage in public situations (getting a child into a school, handling tax, booking a restaurant table, managing property) which may involve any form of antagonism” (pg 11). Whereas professionals once anchored capital in the public sphere, now they facilitate its escape.

    He uses this to make the fascinating argument that the super-rich may benefit from further neoliberalisation, but it’s unclear how actively they are supporting it. Agency in this sense allows them to avoid becoming a class-for-itself, highlighting a micro-social disjuncture between the economic and the political which prevailing concepts of ‘neoliberalism’ are unable to capture. As a project it “required considerable solidarity and reflexive self-understanding on the part of capitalists and ideologues themselves, through think tanks, lobbying bodies, political parties, philanthropic networks” (pg 14). But if I understand correctly, its success has eroded the conditions which made the is possible while also making it less necessary than was once the case. In its place, we have increasingly complex webs of “non-hierarchical, non-exploitative dyadic contractual relations” (pg 15) which often overlap within super-rich networks in which intermediaries have become full members over the preceding decades. It follows from this that the problem is not wealth corrupting politics, as much as “how wealth is kept entirely separate from politics and public life, through strategic acts of delegation, where the delegate is also a delegator” (pg 15).

  • Mark 6:11 pm on May 4, 2018 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , class, deindustrialisation, , ,   

    The quiet revolution of deindustrialization 

    One of the prevailing motifs of the Trumpist era has been the recognition on all sides of the social and political costs of deindustrialization, even if this recognition is typically subsumed into a prior political stance. There’a really powerful account on pg 52 of George Packer’s Unwinding which conveys the scale of this change and the curious manner in which it remained obscure, a profound change for the worse in the lives of a vast aggregate which stubbornly resisted becoming the object of contention one might otherwise have expected:

    John Russo, a former auto worker from Michigan and professor of labor studies, started teaching at Youngstown State University in 1980. When he arrived, he could look down almost every city street straight into a mill and the fire of a blast furnace. He came just in time to watch the steel industry vanish before his eyes. Russo calculated that during the decade between 1975 and 1985, fifty thousand jobs were lost in the Mahoning Valley—an economic catastrophe on an unheard-of scale. Yet, Russo said, “The idea that this was systemic didn’t occur.” As a resident expert, he would get a call from Time or Newsweek every six months, with a reporter on the line asking if Youngstown had turned the corner yet. Apparently it was impossible to imagine that so much machinery and so many men were no longer needed. It was happening in Cleveland, Toledo, Akron, Buffalo, Syracuse, Pittsburgh, Bethlehem, Detroit, Flint, Milwaukee, Chicago, Gary, St. Louis, and other cities across a region that in 1983 was given a new name: the Rust Belt. But it happened in Youngstown first, fastest, and most completely, and because Youngstown had nothing else, no major-league baseball team or world-class symphony, the city became an icon of deindustrialization, a song title, a cliché. “It was one of the quietest revolutions we’ve ever had,” Russo said. “If a plague had taken away this many people in the Midwest, it would be considered a huge historical event.” But because it was caused by the loss of blue-collar jobs, not a bacterial infection, Youngstown’s demise was regarded as almost normal.

    It highlights the relationship between deindustrialisation as a socio-economic process and individualisation as a cultural phenomenon. A growing tendency to resist structural explanation, interpretation causes and consequences in terms of individuals and their lives, constrains attempts to collectively force these changes onto the political agenda as a matter of contestation.

  • Mark 8:04 am on August 9, 2017 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , class, , , , , , ,   

    The populist right are demotic, rather than democratic 

    In an important essay earlier this year, Jan-Werner Müller identifies a dangerous tendency for leftist critics to take the claims of right-populist demagogues at face value. Suddenly vindicated in their struggle with the ‘third way’ that has dominated the centre-left, the claims of nascent populists to speak for a ‘left behind’ majority, created by the neoliberalism which has consumed mainstream social democratic parties, has imbued many leftists with a newfound self-confidence.

    This risks simplifying events with a complex array of causes, like the vote for Brexit and Trump’s election, imputing them to the quasi-magical capacity of populists to speak directly to the people. In doing so, it hinders the detailed analysis of these events which we so urgently need: see for instance this important essay by Mike Davis which discusses the American conservative movement’s massive investment in political infrastructure across every state in the country.

    However it also lends credence to the populist right, supporting claims of speaking for those left behind which belie the naked class hatred which some of these figures exhibited in the recent past. This is what Angela Nagle argues in her important book Kill All Normies. From pg 101:

    Ann Coulter had long drawn upon the elite fear of the hysterical and easily led crowd. In her book Demonic: How the Liberal Mob is Endangering America explaining how ‘the liberal mob is destroying America’ she drew upon Gustave LeBon, the misanthropists’ favorite theorist of the masses. Her writing on overbreeding, overcrowding swarms of immigrants is a direct continuation of this theme, which has been consistent in elite circles since the beginning of industrialized urbanized mass society, first applied to their multiplying native proletariat and later to new waves of immigrants. Before the ‘ordinary people’ narrative became suddenly ubiquitous on the new online right after the election results, Milo could be seen in photo shoots wearing a ‘Stop Being Poor’ T-shirt, a quote from the heiress Paris Hilton, one of his idols. After the election results he was giving talks about the white working class. The hard alt-right had also rejected the idea that the masses were their naturally traditionalist allies any longer, as the conservative establishment had typically believed. Instead, they had argued that the great mass of society had been tainted and indoctrinated by liberal feminist multiculturalism, and were close to beyond redemption. It was no longer ‘five minutes to midnight’ as the anti-immigration right had long claimed but well past midnight. While the Trumpians are busy quickly rewriting history, it is important to remember that behind the ‘populist’ president, the rhetoric of his young online far-right vanguard had long been characterized by an extreme subcultural snobbishness toward the masses and mass culture.

    I wonder if Graham Turner’s distinction between the demotic and the democratic, made in the context of reality television, might be useful here. One could be said to involve foregrounding ‘the people’ as an imagined construct, the other involves empowering people as a social reality. The populist right is demotic, not democratic. This is what the leftist critique of mainstream social democracy, which I’m otherwise entirely in agreement with, risks obscuring.

  • Mark 10:13 am on February 8, 2017 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , class, , , , , , , , , , ,   

    Uber as a moral project 

    When the Uber co-founders recount the story of their project, they stress the importance of the consumer to it. This might seem like familiar rhetoric but I want to suggest it reflects a deep (and problematic) commitment. In The Upstarts, by Brad Stone, we see how the early idea for Uber came to Garrett Camp when he was a young multi-millionaire living in San Francisco. After StumbleUpon was acquired by eBay, he found himself young, free and wealthy. From loc 617-632:

    Camp continued to work at eBay after the sale, and he was now young, wealthy, and single, with a taste for getting out of the house more often. This is when he ran headlong into San Francisco’s feeble taxi industry. For decades, San Francisco had deliberately kept the number of taxi medallions capped at around fifteen hundred. Medallions in the city were relatively inexpensive and couldn’t be resold, and owners could keep the permit as long as they liked if they logged a minimum number of hours on the road every year. So new permits usually became available only when drivers died, and anyone who applied for one had to wait years to receive it. Stories abounded about a driver waiting for three decades to get a medallion, only to die soon after. The system guaranteed a healthy availability of passengers for the taxi companies even during slow times and ensured that full-time drivers could earn a living wage. But demand for cars greatly exceeded supply and so taxi service in San Francisco, famously, sucked. Trying to hail a cab in the outer neighborhoods near the ocean, or even downtown on a weekend night, was an exercise in futility. Getting a cab to take you to the airport was a stomach-churning gamble that could easily result in a missed flight.

    He was, as Brad Stone puts it, “habitually restless, frustrated by inefficiencies, and armed with a willingness to challenge authority”. He contrived an initial solution of calling all yellow taxi companies when he needed a cab, in order to take the first one that arrived. He quickly found himself blacklisted (loc 647). He further explored how to game the existing system, learning about the mechanisms which frustrated him in the process. He developed an extensive working knowledge of how the collective interests of taxi drivers frustrated his interests as a wealthy young consumer. This generic propensity of the taxi industry to frustrate was coupled with the capacity of individual taxi drivers to fail to show such young consumers the respect they felt they deserved. From loc 771-786:

    On a separate night in Paris, the group went for drinks on the Champs-Élysées and then to an elegant late-night dinner that included wine and foie gras. At 2: 00 a.m., somewhat intoxicated after a night of revelry, they hailed a cab on the street. Apparently they were speaking too boisterously, because halfway through the ride home, the driver started yelling at them. McCloskey was sitting in the middle of the backseat, and, at five feet ten inches tall, she’d had to prop her high heels on the cushion between the two front seats. The driver cursed at them in French and threatened to kick them out of the car if they didn’t quiet down and if McCloskey didn’t move her feet. She spoke French and translated; Kalanick reacted furiously and suggested they get out of the car. The experience seemed to harden their resolve. “It definitely lit a fire,” McCloskey says. “When you are put in a situation where you feel like there’s an injustice, that pisses Travis off more than anything. He couldn’t get over it. People shouldn’t have to sit in urine-filled cabs after a wonderful night and be yelled at.” That cantankerous Paris taxicab driver may have left an indelible mark on transportation history.

    The instinct here is framed in terms of ‘disruption’ and ‘innovation’ when it is articulated. But the basic moral sentiment is how dare they put their interests over ours? It’s a consumerist entitlement rooted in the extremely specific experience of affluent young consumers. Once embedded, every attempt to preserve the status quo can be experienced as an extension of this basic affront to self-importance. What appears to regulators as an incomprehensible disregard for legality (“You can’t just open a restaurant and say you are going to ignore the health department” as they were told in an early clash, reported on loc 1693) is experienced by ‘the upstarts’ as a commendable failure to be bullied, a refusal to take shit from anyone, whether it’s haughty French taxi drivers or municipal bureaucrats serving their interests. Their professed concern for regulation can be explained away as an allegiance to taxi drivers who don’t know their place. From loc 2348:

    Still embittered by his experience with Christiane Hayashi and the SFMTA, Kalanick instructed Kochman to ignore New York’s Taxi and Limousine Commission and its rules, reasoning that its regulations, under the guise of consumer safety, were really there to protect entrenched taxi interests.

    What I’m describing as a moral project operates on two levels: an intellectual critique of entrenched interests and their failure to adequately serve consumers, as well as an underlying affectivity generated when entrenched privilege meets perceived wrong-doing. The former derives its shoving power from the latter. This is why I suspect the Uber co-founders might not simply be driving towards automation out of economic interest, but rather actually be able to take some perverse delight in rendering taxi drivers redundant as a category. As the Uber CEO excitedly put it when presented with a self-driving car for the first time: “The minute your car becomes real, I can take the dude out of the front seat” (loc 3657).

    And this moral project is one it’s demonstrably possible to enlist others into. From loc 2467:

    After Tusk joined as a consultant, Uber executives started meeting regularly with Ashwini Chhabra and his boss, David Yassky, chairman of the TLC. Officials in Bloomberg’s business-friendly administration, it turned out, were inclined to look favorably on a technology startup trying to change New York’s crusty taxi industry, which had resisted modernizing its vehicles and installing electronic credit card readers. 4 But Uber first needed to play by the rules. To truly appeal to New York drivers, Uber was going to have to register as a base.

    Pity those who find themselves on the wrong side of the great disruptive project:

    When asked about driverless cars, he said that he was excited for the technology because it could bring prices down, but he didn’t express concern about unemployment for drivers. “The reason Uber could be expensive is because you’re not just paying for the car, you’re paying for the other dude in the car,” Kalanick said. As for the tens of thousands of drivers who relied on his company to support their families, he shrugged. “This is the way of the world,” he said, “and the world isn’t always great. We all have to find ways to change.”

  • Mark 10:01 am on May 26, 2016 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: , , class, distinction, orwell,   

    Before Bourdieu, there was Orwell 

    I love this little passage, quoted on pg 172 of Zizek’s Trouble in Paradise:

    We all rail against class-distinctions, but very few people seriously want to abolish them. Here you come upon the important fact that every revolutionary opinion draws part of its strength from a secret conviction that nothing can be changed … The fact that has got to be faced is that to abolish class-distinctions means abolishing a part of yourself. Here am I, a typical member of the middle class. It is easy for me to say that I want to get rid of class-distinctions, but nearly everything I think and do is a result of class-distinctions. All my notions –notions of good and evil, of pleasant and unpleasant, of funny and serious, of ugly and beautiful –are essentially middle-class notions; my taste in books and food and clothes, my sense of honour, my table manners, my turns of speech, my accent, even the characteristic movements of my body, are the products of a special kind of upbringing and a special niche about half-way up the social hierarchy. 31

  • Mark 10:44 am on April 11, 2016 Permalink
    Tags: , , class, , ,   

    Pity those ‘trapped by their wealth’ 

    I wonder how widespread this sentiment is? Obviously there are particular aspects of the Cameron case that this analysis applies to, but it’s hard not to suspect that it reveals a broader world view in which wealth is seen as a constraint due to residual class antagonism:

    You often hear of people being “trapped in poverty”, but it is also possible to be trapped in wealth. This is David Cameron’s fate. He is not a financially greedy man, or stinking rich, but he comes from a background in which hereditary wealth is the norm; his wife Samantha even more so. He does not think such wealth is wrong – if he did, he would have an easy remedy: get rid of it – but he finds it embarrassing. He also knows that it can make him politically vulnerable.

    Once he began, years ago, to play along with the essentially Left-wing idea that private money is suspect and that tax-planning and legal avoidance are immoral, he was trapped. Now everything he has done in this area is made to look dodgy. Yet it is little different from saving in a tax-free ISA or even buying duty-free drink.


  • Mark 10:16 am on March 15, 2016 Permalink
    Tags: , class, , , republicanism,   

    The Republican elite are now openly declaring their contempt for the American white working class  

    Thanks to Mark Thoma for flagging up an astonishing article published in the journal of the GOP’s intellectual elite. Is this something once unspoken now being given voice? If we are concerned about Trump’s authoritarianism, should we be equally concerned about the potentially terrifying actions liable to be licensed by such naked contempt for vast swathes of your own population?  

     The truth about these dysfunctional, downscale communities is that they deserve to die. Economically, they are negative assets. Morally, they are indefensible. Forget all your cheap theatrical Bruce Springsteen crap. Forget your sanctimony about struggling Rust Belt factory towns and your conspiracy theories about the wily Orientals stealing our jobs. Forget your goddamned gypsum, and, if he has a problem with that, forget Ed Burke, too. The white American underclass is in thrall to a vicious, selfish culture whose main products are misery and used heroin needles. Donald Trump’s speeches make them feel good. So does OxyContin. What they need isn’t analgesics, literal or political. They need real opportunity, which means that they need real change, which means that they need U-Haul.


  • Mark 3:54 pm on August 20, 2011 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: class, eden lake, , , return of the repressed, ,   

    Chavs, Feral Youth, Moral Panics, #UKRiots 

    I’ve been reading Chavs by Owen Jones all day and I’m surprised by quite how broadly thought-provoking it is. From the reviews I was certainly expecting a good book but not such a sensitive and wide ranging engagement with the culture and politics of modern Britain. One thing that particularly piqued my curiosity was his references to Eden Lake, a horror film released in 2008, which tells the story of a ‘normal’ couple from Islington (intriguingly I can’t find any references to the man’s job, while the woman is a nursery teacher) who go on holiday for the weekend to a secluded spot in the West Midlands. An encounter with local kids, ‘feral youths’, sets off a chain of events which, as you can make out from the trailer below, doesn’t end very well:

    Apparently when the couple first arrive, upon finding out that the titular lake is to be made into a gated community, utter some liberal platitudes about such things being bad… then they end up getting tortured and killed by the people such a gate would be keeping out. Sounds like subtle stuff. If it wasn’t for the fact I hate horror films (didn’t use to, not sure what changed) I probably would watch it though, simply out of morbid curiosity.

    What’s bizarre and incredibly telling is the extent to which some have seemingly viewed this film as, in effect, a docudrama. This is my favourite of the reviews I read on IMDB:

    I watched Eden Lake last night and now I’m angry.

    Not because the film was bad (on the contrary, it was very good); not because the nastiest character was called Brett (when surely it’s common knowledge that all blokes named Brett are extremely nice); not because I had to watch the film on my portable DVD player while the wife watched ‘I’m A Celebrity… Get Me Outta Here!’ on the telly; and not because a rather silly ending spoils what might have been an otherwise perfect piece of entertainment.

    No…. I’m angry because, with Eden Lake, I’ve been shown the terrifying truth about one of the biggest evils currently plaguing the UK (I’ll give you a clue: it likes to wear Burberry and has lousy taste in music!).

    That’s right: I’m talking about Chavs!

    If, like me, you find that yob culture makes your blood boil, then you too will be absolutely seething by the end of this excellent film, which cleverly taps into the viewer’s fury, fear and frustration with loutish teenagers who are free to terrorise the innocent because the law lacks the power to punish them.

    In Eden Lake, Director James Watkins presents a harrowing fictional account of one such incident in which a couple are subjected to unbelievable pain and humiliation by a gang of nasty young thugs. The sickening atrocities perpetrated by Watkins’ lawless delinquents are terrifyingly real (reports on similar real-life events can all-too-often be found in today’s tabloids) and serve only too well to highlight just how far our society has sunk in recent years.

    So if the middle classes are doomed to be prey, cowering within gated communities as unavoidable refuges against the teeming hoards outside, the natural question is whether there are any agents of moral order left within society? Step forward Harry Brown, the protagonist in a film that came out a year after Eden Lake, with Michael Caine playing the militant embodiment of the ‘respectable working class’. I wrote about this at the time here:

    This film tells the story of Harry Brown, a pensioner living on a decaying housing estate in South London. Formerly a marine, Harry now lives a lonely life, with his wife on death’s door in hospital and few friends in an area increasingly plagued by drugs and crime. The film tells the story of Harry’s stand against the anarchy he perceives around him and the events that forced him to take action. While his friend Len lives in a state of constant fear unknown to Harry, he himself is not immune to it. Time after time, fear of the ‘hoodies’ in the subway by his estate forces him into taking the long route over the dual carriageway. Over and over again the film bombards the viewer with this message that we live in a broken society where the criminal leave the law abiding at best inconvenienced and disgusted, at worst terrified and broken. At times it’s difficult not to wonder if the film was produced in alliance with the Conservative Research Department given its continual graphic illustration of the Tory ‘Broken Britain’ theme.

    Basically when Harry decides to take a stand, refusing to live in fear of the ‘feral youth’ the viewer meets in Eden Lake, he puts his army training to good use and brutalises a whole string of young people with barbed wire, knifes and guns. I do think that this is actually a good film, albeit a nasty and mean-spirited one, whereas Eden Lake just sounds shit:

    How many people viewing Harry Brown cheered him on as he went on his killing spree? A brave and respectable man with a cause, standing up to the violent nihilistic subhumans who are eviscerating what remains of the social fabric with each ‘good’ citizen they intimidate and/or make a victim of (as well as a litany of other such crimes which don’t feature in a film like this e.g. having children outside of a respectable family structure) – the film works dramatically because, it seems, swathes of its audience instinctively recognise the moral universe it portrays. Even those who might subsequently intellectually disown any experience of thinking that Harry Brown straight forwardly represents the pervasive reality of modern Britain.

    Do films like this represent a return of the repressed? Is there an obsession with class, stalking consciousness and lurking in nightmares, because of its effective erasure from public discourse, as the Thatcherite project was solidified by New Labour’s re-articulation of the social democratic problematic as a matter of using capitalist growth to fund measures which increase ‘social mobility’ in order to help erode ‘social exclusion’ one newly minted middle class family at a time.

    It’s hard not to wonder where this spectre might lead, as austerity begins to bite and a beleaguered radical right-wing government digs in its heels to push through its extreme legislative agenda. Perhaps this is also a crucial part of the socio-emotional topography of #UKRiots, as such an unsettling number of people were so quickly calling for the army to be sent in to the streets of London. When challenged over and over again on Twitter to justify myself for suggesting this was a bad idea, it did briefly feel like the world was going completely mad (though unplugging the wifi for a bit made this feeling go away).

    There has been a moral panic brewing in the back of the middle class British psyche for a long time and I don’t think it has come even close to playing itself out yet. We live in strange and troubling times.

    • Arjun Sen 4:10 pm on August 20, 2011 Permalink

      As an Indian I am a little surprised why people, especially those in the West, go into all kinds of gobbledegook to theorise about such a trivial thing as the UK riots. It is trivial because if you are creating a situation where people don’t have a livelihood they are not going to have a stake in any of things that the other classes have, whoever they are – middle class or working class or whatever other “obsession” about human beings one may have. The world belongs to every single thing on this planet but if a very miniscule number of people begin to control everything then riots, climate change, species mass extinction – all these are obvious and trivial outcomes. You don’t need too much intellect to understand that – nor do you need too much theory to do so. Of course, I am a fool and maybe quite wrong!

    • Mark 4:39 pm on August 20, 2011 Permalink

      I’d basically agree with a lot of that! The above are just some scattered thoughts about films and politics, on a rainy afternoon when I’m struggling to concentrate on the work I’m supposed to be doing.

      I think your assessment of intellectual reaction to the riots is very obviously wrong though – there’s been almost no attempt to theorise the riots, or understand them at all really, at least within mainstream political debate. Likewise the fact that you’re talking about ‘such a trivial thing as the UK riots’ seems wrong… even if you simply mean that, compared to other things going on in the world, it’s not that major an event. They’re going to stand as a hugely important event in modern UK history and the fall out from them is going to have a massive impact on British politics at a time when an ultra right-wing government (of a very rare sort in a number of ways) is trying to push through radical policies at a time of once in a century global economic crisis.

      For what it’s worth, you’re obviously offering a theory yourself – you’re making observations about the world around you and offering an explanation through which to make sense of those observations. It’s just that because it’s simple and to the point, you don’t see it as a theory, you see it as common sense. With the result that you’re incredibly dismissive about something ‘as trivial as the UK riots’ because the way you understand politics, in spite of the motivation I’d agree with at the heart of it, leaves you uninterested in particularly looking at evidence because you see the truth as obvious and attempts to think further about it as ‘all kinds of gobbledegook’.

      Genuinely no hostility or irritation expressed in the above (well maybe a little bit about the fact you think the UK riots are trivial) but that’s because I share at least some of the politics that’s making it. The same kind of argument you just made is used by millions of people the world over to shut down critical debate and stop people asking angry questions about the world though – it works just as well for those who are saying we should stop going on about silly ideas of fairness and justice, instead embracing capitalism as something that will make everyone richer (etc etc)

    • informant 4:53 pm on August 20, 2011 Permalink

      Like the post on moral panics – and I do think they are an expression of the things people cannot admit to – the problems with the world they have created – the problems that they would rather pretend aren’t there.

      Got to say I sort of agree with Arjun though. I think the intention was not to call the riots trivial, but to say that solving the problem of why they happened is trivial. And it is: the wealth divide. Having said that, I think it is worth investigating more specific causes – i.e. why they happened right at this moment.

      My post on it: http://withtheresistance.com/me-and-the-rioters/

    • Arjun Sen 6:08 pm on August 20, 2011 Permalink

      Many thanks for your comments. I think I was a little bit too angry to try and dismiss the UK riots as trivial. I was not actually doing that – I was just trying to provoke.

      I was instead trying to say that capitalism has now reached a stage where theorists, especially in the fields of economics and sociology, should stop deluding themselves.

      Any honest appraisal of modern economics and sociology as theoretical subjects used to understand human social production and reproduction would show that not only these two subjects but a few other subjects such as history and anthropology in particular and a few other so-called “humanities” (as they are called in India) subjects or “liberal arts” (as they are called in the US) subjects, are entirely victims of delusion because they have, I mean the theorists in these fields, have deliberately tried to build theoretical models that were intended to delude the people and hide the facts. That was the very purpose behind all the so-called “theoretical” development of these subjects.

      These delusions are now haunting the deluders because now they find that in all these subjects, by deluding themselves all these years, they have not been able to develop the scientific tools they need to manage human society in a rational and scientific way. Economics is a specific case in point where even an official bigwig (to give just one example) such as Mr Adair Turner, chairman of Britain’s Financial Services Authority, is writing about challenging conventional wisdom in economics and if his gobbledygook is translated into scientific terms it turns out he is actually talking about basic problems of capitalism that had been understood and identified 16 decades ago. But since economic theory was built to hide these basic facts, today it is incapable of dealing with these facts or how to create a more rational economy.

      We social scientists were tasked to produce delusions that would hide all the hard realities that this poor and disgusting, carbuncle-infested, (Galbraith, in fact, believed that Mrax’s carbuncles were to blame for his “hatred” for the”bourgeosie” – how comical can delusions become, I wonder?), German pest had exposed and we have done so. Thus, today, Mr Turner is now a victim of the very delusions that his ilk has created over the past 160 years and quite unwittingly he is now vituperating about these same delusions. How comical? How ironic?.

      Today, we are scientific and rational about everything except when it comes to human society because it is class riven and the ruling classes control social science to produce delusions..

      This ideological game has now taken us all to the brink. The gobbledygook that I referred to refers to a subject that calls itself social science, yet it is a subject that starts with assumptions that simply wish away certain basic commonly observed and known facts of life – and that’s when a theory becomes gobbledygook – when it misses the empirical facts even as it starts theorising – when it misses empirically observable and verifiable facts such as the existence of class riven society, exploitation of labour power, extraction of surplus value, the very character of capitalism and, of course, historical materialism – all these hard facts of empirical, objective reality – when they are deliberately left out of the theorising, that’s when gobbledygook of enormous quantities begin to get produced and it has been produced – mountains of it.

      I am tired of all that, and I am angry. Sorry.

      And yes, about historical materialism, it is hard science because we follow this in zoology, biology and in the study of all possible forms of life and we globally also accept these subjects, which do nothing but historical materialism, as hard science, as long as these subjects confine themselves to everything else but humans. But when it comes to humans, we resort to gobbledygook mass producers – all the theorists who joined hands to prove that historical materialism is bullshit, that Marx is bullshit, all this HM being a science etc is bunkum – Weber, Levi Strauss, the marginalist mathematical mumbo jumbo producers – a whole galaxy of luminaries who spent their lifetimes producing lies because that was their task. They were paid for it. It is actually a wonderful history of social science theorising during the last century of forgettable human history where top theorists have spent quality time producing bunkum, high quality lies!.

      I think it is time for people like you to give up your theoretical bullshits – go back to studying German Ideology and the first premises of human history and begin from there – scientifically, in an unbiased way and without being the paid servants of the capitalist class and spewing gobbledygook. And pardon me for being angry! The poor of the world are angry! It’s a hard empirical fact. And, Oh yes! I almost forgot. Start looking at facts before you start theorising. The Marxists after Marx have been making that mistake too.

      P.S. When I debate I can be rather offensive, but I don’t mean to be person to person, so please pardon me for my harsh comments if any.

    • Mark 7:01 pm on August 20, 2011 Permalink

      And again I agree with a huge amount of this – particularly the ideological role that social science, most dramatically certain strands in economics, have played in propping up global capitalism in recent decades! But, without being rude, I can’t take your rejection of theory seriously: you attack theory on one hand and then talk in an endless stream of theoretical concepts, you argue that social science is nothing more than ideology then make the arguments of a left-wing 19th century social scientist, you explicitly engage with methodological and theoretical questions then say that engaging with questions like this is pointless. You say ‘people like you should give up your theoretical bullshits’ then tell me to go back to Marx. I agree with much of what you’re saying BUT the way you’re saying it (e.g. the way you shift from talking about ‘we social scientists’ to saying that ‘people like you’ should give up theoretical bullshits) makes me think that this is, at least in part, a product of an argument you’ve either had or are having with yourself. You seem to be projecting a whole host of things on to me which just aren’t true (e.g. I’ve been involved in activist causes since I was a teenager, I’ve been involved seriously in academia only for the length of being a masters and part-time PhD student) and, more obviously, there’s no way you have any basis to know if they are true or not. And it’ll probably get a bit dull for me if you keep doing it 🙂

      Plus I just can’t take the idea seriously that there’s no value within any aspect of social science because all questions have been answered by the ‘hard science’ of historical materialism. I don’t say this because I’m an unwitting cog in the ideological machine of social science, I don’t say this because I’m trapped within some delusion grand theoretical framework, I don’t say this because I’m deliberately trying to turn attention away from all the day-to-day realities of injustice in the world… I say this because I think it’s an absurd idea. I can take seriously a rejection of social science in its entirety, although obviously I’d disagree, but I can’t take seriously a rejection of social science predicated on the idea that one 19th century social scientist (interpreted in a particular way which, may I suggest, owes as much to Engels as it does to the man himself) has answered all these questions so we can stop talking about them.

    • Mark 8:58 pm on August 20, 2011 Permalink

      yeah i kind of agree and kind of don’t – there’s a difference between saying what’s at the root of the problem, in the political sense of the term & explaining the causal origins of a particular set of events. i get that you recognise this but i think it has implications for what we suggest politically as solutions…

      really really really like your article on this. ties in hugely with a conversation i was having with meems about uk riots yesterday in fact

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