I found Mari Ruti’s The Call of Character a remarkable book. It offers a psychoanalytical framing of the ‘art of living’: the classical notion that living well is fundamentally a practice which can be undertaken in better or worse ways. At the core her conception is the Lacanian notion of the Thing: the primordial lost object which dimly echoes in the mundane objects which we desire.
In The Call of Character (2013) this is conceived of in terms of our sensitivity to the echo of the Thing. There are little slivers of the sublime we find in certain objects, which can give us direction in how we choose to live. What matters is cultivating a sensitivity to that echo, to better discern when we hear the call and when we do not. It’s only through doing so that we can be faithful to our own desire.
In The Creative Self (2025)* this is conceived of in terms of placing the glow into these objects. Lacan’s phrase about raising mundane object to the dignity of the Thing is taken quite literally at points, as if there is a choice about when and how we do this. It’s still acknowledged that we find objects with this sliver already embedded but Ruti says that “many forms of creativity are a matter of generating this glow” (loc 324). Particularly towards the end of her section, Ruti argues that we need to be discerning about which objects we raise in this way. We should be highly selective: “Not all objects should qualify; the objects in question should have something genuinely special about them” (loc 2105). I can see three different relations being posited here:
- Discovering the echo of the Thing in a mundane object
- Creating an object which is an echo of the Thing
- Raising an object to the dignity of the Thing (regardless of where it has the echo)
It’s 3 which troubles me. If it’s a question of which objects should qualify it implies that our raising an object to the dignity of the Thing is a voluntaristic action. We choose what to elevate in a concrete way, with the corollary that sometimes our choices are mistaken. I don’t understand what this choice entails though: the examples Ruti cites draws heavily on Marion Milner’s creative practice which I read as much more to do with 1 i.e. cultivating qualities of attention which enable us to discover the echo/glow in the mundane objects of the world. What 3 shares with 2 is a subtle voluntarism which I think sits uneasily with the psychoanalytical logic of the argument. I also don’t think it fits Ruti’s own account of her personal experience of creativity which has much more in keeping with the receptive unconscious rather than a purposeful practice of sublimation.
I see why Ruti wants to do this, I think. It provides a critical vantage point in which something like existential authenticity can be a bulwark against the siren song of consumer capitalism. The problem is that I don’t think it works. I think the psychoanalytical logic is betrayed by the political uses to which it is put. This is not to say that I don’t think psychoanalysis has political implications. Clearly it does. But I don’t think it can be used to provide the foundation for a critical theory. Or at least not as neatly as Ruti is trying to do.
As you can tell from the last few days of blogging, this point is bugging me. I want to emphasise that I love Ruti’s work. This has been a revelation to me. But the reason why I never found critical theory deploying psychoanalysis intellectually satisfying in the past remains the case here, albeit in a more subdued way.
*This is written with Gail Newman but they seem to have written their sections individually.
Mark Carrigan 