Raiding the inarticulate since 2010

accelerated academy acceleration agency AI Algorithmic Authoritarianism and Digital Repression archer Archive Archiving artificial intelligence automation Becoming Who We Are Between Post-Capitalism and Techno-Fascism big data blogging capitalism ChatGPT claude Cognitive Triage: Practice, Culture and Strategies Communicative Escalation and Cultural Abundance: How Do We Cope? Corporate Culture, Elites and Their Self-Understandings craft creativity critical realism data science Defensive Elites Digital Capitalism and Digital Social Science Digital Distraction, Personal Agency and The Reflexive Imperative Digital Elections, Party Politics and Diplomacy digital elites Digital Inequalities Digital Social Science Digital Sociology digital sociology Digital Universities elites Fragile Movements and Their Politics Cultures generative AI higher education Interested labour Lacan Listening LLMs margaret archer Organising personal morphogenesis Philosophy of Technology platform capitalism platforms Post-Democracy, Depoliticisation and Technocracy post-truth psychoanalysis public engagement public sociology publishing Reading realism reflexivity scholarship sexuality Shadow Mobilization, Astroturfing and Manipulation Social Media Social Media for Academics social media for academics social ontology social theory sociology technology The Content Ecosystem The Intensification of Work theory The Political Economy of Digital Capitalism The Technological History of Digital Capitalism Thinking trump twitter Uncategorized work writing zizek

The ontology of virtual worlds

Virtual world: an interactive computer-generated world

Virtual reality: an immersive, interactive computer-generated world

This is how David Chalmers (he of Zombies fame for undergraduate philosophers of my generation) defines virtual worlds and virtual reality in a recent Philosopher 1923 discussion. His point is that “virtual reality is genuine reality” in contrast to those who see it as an illusion, hallucination or second class reality. He argues it is a digital reality rather than a physical reality but no less real for this:

It follows from this that for him we can lead a fully meaningful life in Virtual Reality. This is an idea I’m sceptical about but which I don’t think can be dismissed lightly. It raises important questions about what a meaningful life is, the conditions which make it possible and whether virtual reality can provide these conditions. The obvious sociological objection to this is what on earth does it mean to live in virtual reality? Even if we imagine someone who is immersed in virtual reality 24/7 there still needs to be structures which support their embodiment, ensure connectivity and facilitate sustained immersion. In popular dystopian scenarios virtual reality becomes an escape from a crisis-ridden world but this still entails a relationship between virtual reality and physical reality.

Once we recognise that life necessarily includes some balance between the real and virtuality, it precludes the dichotomy on which Chalmers is depending. In other words I’m not sure how we can ask the question in the way Chalmers does without obliterating the social context. It sets up ‘meaningfulness’ as a feature of individual experience rather than the relationship which a socially embedded person has with a reality which includes other people.